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IMMATURITY AND IRRESPONSIBI~iTY
STEPEEN J. MORSE"
I. INTRODUCTION
Our image of teenage offenders vacillates. We see them as
wayward youths, as kids gone wrong, but who are nonetheless
not "bad." This image is of the teen as a victim. They are mis-
guided, immature, insufficiently socialized, but not evil. What
they need is a therapeutic response that will permit natural
maturation and socialization to set them on the right path. In
contrast, we also see teen offenders as hostile predators, the
products of unfortunate environments and perhaps heredity,
who have little or no human sympathy or regard. This image is
of the teen as a full-fledged criminal. Because they are evil and
fully responsible, they must be punished to satisfy just deserts
and to protect the public. At the extreme, they deserve to be
executed. In the anecdotal reports that fill the media and that
often drive public policy, it is not hard to find either image.
The image of the teen offender as a criminal seems cur-
rently to predominate. Mid- to late-adolescence is a high-risk
age for offending, especially violent offending,1 and the in-
creased availability and common use of weapons2 makes teen
violence particularly frightening. Although violent crime rates,
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including rates of violent juvenile crime,3 are down in most ma-
jor cities of the United States, the public still fears teen violence.
Pictures of youths throwing a small boy to his death from a roof-
top and of gang slaughter fill our minds. We are warned that a
cohort of "superpredators" will soon emerge as the inevitable
result of demographic variables.4
The legislative and judicial reaction to public concern about
serious and violent teen offenders has been substantial. Since
1992, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have made
changes in their laws governing the response to serious and vio-
lent juvenile offenders.5 The rate at which the juvenile offender
has been removed from the juvenile system and prosecuted in
the criminal justice system has skyrocketed. Additionally, the
traditional confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings and re-
cords is yielding to greater openness.
Critics of these changes believe that they are unfair to juve-
niles, because juveniles are not fully responsible for their of-
fenses, and that they will not protect public safety, because a
criminal justice response will simply harden the antisocial ten-
dencies already exhibited. They wish the juvenile justice system
would adopt more flexible dispositional options that would give
kids a genuine chance to grow up straight, while simultaneously
exerting enough control over them to protect the public.
The common law treated people fourteen-years-old as fully
responsible.6 Many think the common law was wise; many dis-
agree. This paper addresses the claim that adolescent offenders
are not fully responsible moral and legal agents. I make the as-
sumption, which is almost universally shared in Anglo-American
criminal jurisprudence, that desert based on moral fault is at
least a necessary pre-condition for just punishment. If youths
3 OFFICE OFJUVENILEJUSTICE PROGRAMS, JtVENILEJUSTICE REFORM INITIATIVES IN THE
STATES 1994-1996, 6 (1997); MEussA SIamuND ET AL., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 16-19 (1997) (violent victimizations by juveniles
declined more than those by adults; one in seven juvenile arrests was for a crime of
violence in 1995; after consistent increase from 1985-94, juvenile violent arrest rate
declined in 1995).
4 SeWuitMJ. BENNETTFETAL., BODYCOUNT 26-29 (1996).
- PATRICIA TORBET ET AL.., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENTJUVEN.E CRIME
59 (1996); see also SIMON I. SINGER, RECRIMINAUZING DEuNQUENCY VIOLENTJUVENILE
CRIMES AND JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM (1996) (analysis of New York's attempt to treat
violentjuvenile offenders as adult criminals).
WAYNE LAFAVE & AuSTIN SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 399 (2d ed. 1986).
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are to be adjudicated and punished like adults, it is therefore
crucial to address the desert of youthful offenders. The focus
on desert is not intended to gainsay the importance of other ju-
venile justice goals, such as prevention or reform. Depending
on one's theory of punishment, such goals may be of great im-
portance. But these other goals will be addressed only as they
relate to the article's central question-the moral and ultimately
legal responsibility of adolescent offenders.
We cannot think sensibly about this issue unless we first
have in place a robust theory of responsibility generally. Only
then will we be in a position to consider the relation of what we
know about juveniles developmentally and psychosocially to as-
criptions of responsibility to juveniles. Indeed, the primary goal
of this paper is to provide a theory of responsibility with which
juvenile responsibility can be properly addressed. Part II there-
fore offers a theory of responsibility that is rooted in our current
moral theories and actual practices of blaming and punishing.
Part Ill explores whether juveniles meet the test of responsibility
Part H provides. In particular, to determine which juveniles de-
serve mitigation, it reviews psychosocial and developmental
variables that differentiate juveniles from adults. Part IV ad-
dresses the dispositional consequences that Parts II and Ill im-
ply. I conclude that neither common sense nor behavioral
science data resolve the issue ofjuvenile responsibility. How we
should respond to juvenile offenders is ultimately a moral
judgment that must be derived from our best normative account
of responsibility.
II. THINKING ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY
This Part begins by explaining the law's concept of the per-
son and how the legal conceptions of responsibility and excus-
ing flow from the account of personhood. It then offers an
account of what we are doing when we hold people responsible.
This Part then offers a broader view of the criteria of responsi-
bility. Finally, it addresses the many confusions about the prem-
ises of excusing that have hindered understanding.
A. THE LAW'S CONCEPT OF THE PERSON AND RESPONSIBILITY
Intentional human conduct, that is, action, unlike other
phenomena, can be explained by physical causes and by reasons
for action. Although physical causes explain the movements of
1997]
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galaxies and planets, molecules, non-human organisms, and all
the other moving parts of the physical universe, only human ac-
tion can also be explained by reasons. It makes no sense to ask
a bull that gores a matador, "Why did you do that?," but this
question makes sense and is vitally important when it is ad-
dressed to a person who sticks a knife into the chest of another
human being. It makes a great difference to us if the knife-
wielder is a surgeon who is cutting with the patient's consent or
a person who is enraged at the victim and intends to kill him.
When one asks about human action, "Why did she do
that?," two distinct types of answers may therefore be given. The
reason-giving explanation accounts for human behavior as a
product of intentions that arise from the desires and beliefs of
the agent. The second type of explanation treats human behav-
ior as simply one more bit of the phenomena of the universe,
subject to the same natural, physical laws that explain all phe-
nomena. Suppose, for example, we wish to explain why Molly
became a criminologist. The reason-giving explanation might
be that she wishes to emulate her admired mother, a prominent
criminologist, and Molly believes that the best way to do so is
also to become a criminologist. If we want to account for why
Molly chose one graduate school rather than another, a per-
fectly satisfactory explanation under the circumstances would be
that Molly knew that the chosen school had the most estimable
criminology department. Philosophers and cognitive scientists
refer to this mode of reason-giving explanation as "folk psychol-
",7Ogy.
The mechanistic type of explanation would approach these
questions quite differently. For example, those who believe that
mind can ultimately be reduced to the biophysical workings of
the brain and nervous system-the eliminative materialists-also
believe that Molly's "decision" is solely the law-governed product
of biophysical causes. Her desires, beliefs, intentions, and
choices are therefore simply epiphenomenal, rather than genu-
ine causes of her behavior. According to this mode of explana-
tion, Molly's "choices" to go to graduate school and to become a
criminologist and all other human behavior are indistinguish-
See generaly John D. Greenwood, Introduction: Folk Psychology and Scientific Psychol-
ogy, in THE FUTURE OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: INTENTIONALITY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE 1, 1-
21 (John D. Greenwood ed., 1991) (providing a descriptive, conceptual and historical
account of folk psychology).
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able from any other phenomena in the universe, including the
movements of molecules and bacteria.
The social sciences, including psychology and psychiatry,
are uncomfortably wedged between the reason-giving and the
mechanistic accounts of human behavior. Sometimes they treat
behavior "objectively," treating it as primarily mechanistic or
physical; other times, social science treats behavior "subjec-
tively," as a text to be interpreted. Yet other times, social sci-
ence engages in an uneasy amalgam of the two. What is always
clear, however, is that the domain of the social sciences is hu-
man action and not simply the movements of bodies in space.
One can attempt to assimilate folk psychology's reason-giving to
mechanistic explanation by claiming that desires, beliefs and in-
tentions are genuine causes, and not simply rationalizations of
behavior. Indeed, folk psychology proceeds on the assumption
that reasons for action are genuinely causal. But the assimila-
tionist position is philosophically controversial,8 a controversy
that will not be solved until the mind-body problem is
"solved"-an event unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.
Law, unlike mechanistic explanation or the conflicted
stance of the social sciences, views human action as almost en-
tirely reason-governed. The law's concept of a person is a prac-
tical reasoning, rule-following being, most of whose legally
relevant movements must be understood in terms of beliefs, de-
sires and intentions. As a system of rules to guide and govern
human interaction,9 the law presupposes that people use legal
rules as premises in the practical syllogisms that guide much
human action. No "instinct" governs how fast a person drives
on the open highway. But among the various explanatory vari-
ables, the posted speed limit and the belief in the probability of
paying the consequences for exceeding it surely play a large role
in the driver's choice of speed. For the law, then, a person is a
practical reasoner. The legal view of the person is not that all
people behave consistently rationally according to some pre-
ordained, normative notion of rationality. It is simply that peo-
ple are creatures who act for and consistently with their reasons
for action and who are generally capable of minimal rationality
8 See ALExANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOcIAL ScIENcE 46-49 (1988).
' The legislatures and courts do not decide what rules infrahuman species must
follow.
1997]
STEPtIENJ MORSE
according to mostly conventional, socially constructed stan-
dards.' °
The law's concept of responsibility follows logically from its
conception of the person and the nature of law itself. As a sys-
tem of rules that guides and governs human interaction, law
tells citizens what they may and may not do, what they must or
must not do, and what they are entitled to. Unless human be-
ings were creatures who could understand and follow the rules
of their society, the law would be powerless to affect human ac-
tion. Rule-followers must be creatures who are generally capa-
ble of properly using the rules as premises in practical
reasoning. It follows that a legally responsible agent is a person
who is so generally capable, according to some contingent,
normative notion both of rationality itself and of how much ca-
pability is required. For example, legal responsibility might re-
quire the capability of understanding the reason for an
applicable rule, as well as the rule's narrow behavior command.
These are matters of moral, political and, ultimately, legal
judgment, about which reasonable people can and do differ. I
shall offer below an interpretation of criminal law's rationality
requirement, but there is no uncontroversial definition of ra-
tionality or of what kind and how much is required for respon-
sibility. These are normative issues and, whatever the outcome
might be within a polity and its legal system, the debate is about
human action-intentional behavior guided by reasons.
Criminal law criteria exemplify the foregoing analysis. Most
substantive criminal laws prohibit harmful conduct. Effective
criminal law requires that citizens must understand what con-
duct is prohibited, the nature of their conduct, and the conse-
quences for doing what the law prohibits. Homicide laws, for
example, require that citizens understand that unjustifiably kill-
ing other human beings is prohibited, what counts as killing
conduct, and that the state will inflict pain if the rule is violated.
A person incapable of understanding the rule or the nature of
her own conduct, including the context in which it is embed-
ded, could not properly use the rule to guide her conduct. For
example, a person who delusionally believed that she was about
'0 See MIcHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY:. RETHINKNG THE RELATIONSHIP 100-
11 (1984); see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 60-64 (1997). Moore would
disagree with social constructivist accounts of the content of rationality.
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to be killed by another person and kills the other in the mis-
taken belief that she must do so to save her own life, does not
rationally understand what she is doing. 'She, of course, knows
that she is killing a human being and does so intentionally.
And, although in the abstract she probably knows and endorses
the moral and legal prohibition against unjustified killing, in
this case the rule against unjustifiable homicide will be ineffec-
tive because she delusionally believes that her action is justifi-
able.
The general incapacity to follow the rule properly is what
distinguishes the delusional agent from people who are simply
mistaken but who have the general ability to follow the rule. In
this context, we believe that the delusional person's failure to
understand is not her fault because she lacked the general ca-
pacity to understand. In contrast, the person capable of prop-
erly following the rule is at fault if she does not do so.
B. HOLDING RESPONSIBLE
My explanation and justification for holding people respon-
sible and blaming them is an internal account, an interpretation
of our practices as I find them. My task is to determine if our
practices are internally coherent and consistent with moral
theories that we accept. Although I acknowledge that responsi-
bility and blame are social constructs, my account is not purely
pragmatic. I am concerned with when it is fair to hold people
responsible, to blame them, and to express our blame through
sanctioning responses. When it is fair individually and socially
to respond in these ways will depend on facts about the agent
and the situation and on moral theory. Thus, assuming that a
coherent and consistent moral account of our practices is possi-
ble, assertions about when it will be fair to hold people respon-
sible will be propositional and have truth value. For example,
we believe that it is unfair to hold young children genuinely and
fully morally responsible for their misdeeds. Whether a
harmdoer is of a certain age and possesses juvenile attributes
are determinate facts and a rich, morally defensible theory
about fairness compels excusing young children. In another
words, I believe that, viewed internally, we are not just express-
ing an emotional preference when we exempt young children
from responsibility.
1997]
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The internalist account I am defending asserts that to hold
someone morally responsible and to blame that person is, first,
to be susceptible to a range of appropriate emotions, such as re-
sentment, indignation or gratitude, just in case that agent
breaches or complies with a moral obligation we accept, and
second, to express those emotions through appropriate negative
or positive practices, such as blame or praise." Moral responsi-
bility criteria and practices are not simply behavioral disposi-
tions to express positive and negative reinforcers. They reflect
moral propositional attitudes towards the agent's conduct. So,
for example, an appropriate responsive expression of blaming
language is rarely intended simply as a negative reinforcer,
emitted solely to decrease the probability of a future breach of
this or a similar moral expectation. It also essentially conveys
the judge's attitude that the agent has done wrong. Because
holding an agent morally responsible expresses a morally pro-
positional attitude, it is not a species of non-cognitive and purely
emotional response. Moral responsibility practices are not
solely propositional, however; they are not just descriptions of
wrongdoing, of the breach of expectations. Again, holding
people morally responsible involves the susceptibility to a set of
reactive emotions that are inherently linked to the practices that
express those emotions. It is one thing to say that behavior
breached a moral expectation. This is an example of objective
description. It is another to hold the agent morally responsible
for that behavior, which involves a complex of emotions and
their expression that have the force of a judgment. This, I be-
lieve, is what we are doing when we hold people morally respon-
sible.
The reactive account theorizes that we hold people morally
responsible if they breach a moral expectation we accept. A
moral expectation that we accept is one that can be normatively
defended by reason. Most of the core prohibitions and obliga-
tions of the criminal law, including its justifications, command
broad normative assent. We might argue about various qualifi-
cations, some of which can be very controversial, but the basic
notions would be difficult to contest. Most core criminal law
prohibitions do not seem unfairly to infringe on freedom or to
" The following defense draws directly and liberally from Jay Wallace's Strawsonian
account SeeR.JAYWALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MoRAL SENIMENTS 51-83 (1994).
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require supererogatory virtue. They are fair expectations, and
we understand the need to give normative reasons if we believe
that they are not fair.
Assuming that some reasonable measure of agreement can
be reached about the content of the criminal law's prohibitions,
the question is when is it just or fair to feel and to express a re-
active emotion in response to a breach of the expectation a
prohibition reflects? The expressions of the negative reactive
emotions, which can in theory range from the mildest expres-
sions of disapproval to the most punitive sanctions, are all likely
to impose pain on the recipient, and if morality has any re-
quirements, it at a minimum necessitates having good reason to
harm another human being. Morality and our law are firmly
committed to a theory of desert that holds that it is unfair to
hold responsible and sanction a person who is not at fault." We
are committed to this principle at the deepest level. Accord-
ingly, it would be unjust to express a negative moral reactive at-
titude either to an agent who did not breach an obligation we
accept or to an agent who lacked the capacity when she
breached to understand and be guided by good, normative rea-
son. To be at fault, an agent must actually breach an expecta-
tion and must have general normative competence and the
general ability at the time to be guided by it. Moral and legal
responsibility and blaming practices track this account.
For example, children lack normative competence because
they are generally unable to grasp the good reasons not to
breach an expectation. The agent acting under duress and
some people with mental disorders may have general normative
competence, but they may be unable to be guided by it in spe-
cific circumstances because, respectively, the choice they face is
too hard or because they are unable fully to comprehend what
they are doing. It would be unfair to hold responsible and
blame such people because they do not deserve it.
The reactive account includes the potential for negative re-
action to the breach of a moral expectation we accept. We
should therefore consider the potential cruelty of negative
moral reactive expression, which always threatens to impose
pain. It may appear that the infliction of pain based on retro-
spective evaluation is necessarily cruel, but this does not follow.
'2 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBmXIY 35-40 (1968).
19971
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One needs some theory of cruelty to guide assessment. As so of-
ten is the case, there is no uncontroversial definition, but let me
use the gratuitous infliction of psychological or physical pain as
the touchstone. The infliction of pain for no good, generaliz-
able reason is cruel. On the reactive account, the imposition of
negative expressions of the reactive emotions is not gratuitous:
It essentially expresses the moral sentiments and gives them
weight. It is possible, of course, that hatred and similar emo-
tions can motivate the judge to impose greater pain than is ap-
propriate to the agent's breach. But the possibility of the cruel
abuse of a practice does not mean that the practice is necessarily
or essentially cruel. A wrongdoer has a legitimate moral expec-
tation that her judge will inflict no more pain than is appropri-
ate under the circumstances, according to some theory of
proportionality that can be normatively defended.
C. THE CRITERIA FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND EXCUSE
The law and morality alike exculpate either because an
agent has not violated a moral prohibition or obligation we ac-
cept, or because the agent has violated the norm, but is gener-
ally or situationally normatively incompetent. In criminal law
terms, the former case includes all doctrines that deny prima fa-
cie liability, such as the absence of a voluntary act or the ab-
sence of appropriate mens rea resulting from ignorance or
mistake; the latter includes the excusing affirmative defenses,
such as legal insanity, duress and infancy. In this subsection I
focus on the latter. I argue that the law and morality include
two generic excusing conditions: non-culpable irrationality (or
normative incompetence) and non-culpable hard choice. An
agent who is non-culpably irrational or faces a sufficiently hard
choice when she breaches a moral obligation is not at fault and
does not deserve to be blamed and punished.
Rationality or normative competence is the most general,
important prerequisite to being morally responsible.3 More
specifically, it means that the agent has the general capacity to
" I state this criterion in alternative terms-rationality or normative competence-
because the concept of rationality is associated with so much historical, conceptual and
philosophical disagreement that the term distracts many people. As I explain infra, I
mean nothing exalted or essential by the term. It is simply a common sense term used to
cover a congeries of human capacities without which morality and human flourishing in
general would be difficult. If the term "rationality" seems too broad, I am perfectly
comfortable with the term "normative competence" alone.
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understand and to be guided by the reasons that support a
moral prohibition that we accept. The agent can be incapable
of rationality in two different respects: either the agent is unable
rationally to comprehend the facts that bear on the morality of
his action or is unable rationally to comprehend the applicable
moral or legal code. For example, the delusional self-defender
is unable rationally to comprehend the most morally relevant
fact bearing on her culpability-whether her life is genuinely
threatened. For another example, a defendant who delusion-
ally believed that she was God's agent, that God's law super-
seded earthly law, and that God wanted her to kill for good
reason, would not be able rationally to comprehend the appli-
cable moral and legal code. Although distinguishable, these
two forms of irrationality could be collapsed into the notion that
the agent is unable rationally to understand what she was doing
when she acted.14 An agent unable rationally to understand
morally what she is doing cannot grasp and be guided by the
good reason not to breach a moral and legal expectation we ac-
cept.
What is the content of rationality that responsibility re-
quires? As part of the normative, socially constructed practice
of blaming, there cannot be a self-defining answer. A norma-
tive, moral and political judgment concerning the content and
degree of rationality is necessary. Nonetheless, some guide is
possible. I do not have an exalted or complicated notion of ra-
tionality, but most generally it includes the ability, in Susan
Wolf's words, "to be sensitive and responsive to relevant changes
in one's situation and environment-that is, to be flexible., 15 It
is the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right, and to
reason instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropri-
ately and according to a minimally coherent preference-
ordering. Put yet another way, it is the ability to act for good
reasons and it is always a good reason not to act (or to act) if do-
ing so (or not doing so) will be wrong. Notice that it is not nec-
essary that the defendant acted for good, generalizable reason
at the time of the crime. Most offenders presumably do not or
" The MY'aghten test for legal insanity distinguishes the two. M'Naghten's Case, 10
Cl. & F. 200 (H.L. 1843). The first prong of the Model Penal Code test collapses the two
rationality defects. Se MODELPENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
" SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM Wrrm-N REAsON 69 (1990).
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they would not have offended. The general normative capacity
to be able to grasp and be guided by reason is sufficient.
After much thought, I have come to the conclusion that
normative competence should require the ability to empathize
and to feel guilt or some other reflexive reactive emotion. Most
of the time when the desire to do harm arises, a police officer is
not at one's elbow. The cost of future official detection, convic-
tion and punishment for most crimes is relatively slight com-
pared to the immediate rewards of satisfying one's desires,
especially if one is a dispositionally steep time discounter. Un-
less an agent is able to put oneself affectively in another's shoes,
to have a sense of what a potential victim will feel as a result of
the agent's conduct, and is able at least to feel the anticipation
of unpleasant guilt for breach, one will lack the capacity to
grasp and be guided by the primary rational reasons for comply-
ing with moral expectations. 16
Perhaps people who lack the capacity for empathy and
guilt-the so-called "psychopaths"-are particularly immoral
and deserve special condemnation rather than excuse, 1 but this
does not seem fair. To the best of our knowledge, some
harmdoers simply lack these capacities and they are not amena-
ble to reason. They may be dangerous people, but they are not
part of our moral community. Once again, it is not required
that the defendant have actually empathized and felt guilt at the
time of the crime. Most wrongdoers presumably do not experi-
ence such states at the time of the crime. A general capacity to
feel these emotions is sufficient to render the agent normatively
rational.
8
16 SeeJohn Deigh, Empathy and Universalizability, 105 ETmIcs 743 (1995) (discussing the
responsibility of psychopaths and the role of empathy in moraljudgment).
17 The law does not at present excuse psychopaths. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
4.01(2) (1962); Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay On
Choice, Character and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719, 746-47 (1992) (claiming that psy-
chopaths are rational and should be held responsible, unless they lack selfish feelings,
which is highly improbable).
"8 As Paul Robinson once pointed out to me in a personal communication, some
people may systematically suppress their capacity to empathize and feel guilt. If so, they
retain the general capacity and are responsible for inactivating it. Professor Robinson
correctly notes that it may be difficult to distinguish those who suppress a capacity they
retain from those who do not have the capacity. This difficulty may be overstated,
however. An examination of an offender's range of relationships should make it easier
to determine if the capacity generally exists. A terrorist may squelch any empathy or
guilt for the victims of her terror, but she may demonstrate with her compatriots that she
retains the general capacity.
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A highly controversial question is whether desires or prefer-
ences in themselves can be irrational.19 It is of course true that
having desires that most people consider irrational is likely to
get someone into trouble, especially if the desires and situations
tempting an actor are strong. Nonetheless, I conclude that even
if desires can be construed as irrational, irrational desires do not
deprive the agent of normative competence unless they some-
how disable the rational capacities just addressed or they pro-
duce an internal hard choice situation distinguishable from the
choices experienced by people with equally strong, rational de-
sires. In other words, if the agent with irrational desires can
comprehend the morally relevant features of her conduct, she
can be held responsible if her irrational desires are the reasons
she breaches an expectation we accept.
Hard choice as an excusing condition requires that the de-
fendant was threatened with harm, unless she did something
even more harmful than the harm threatened. If a person of
reasonable firmness would have yielded under the circum-
stances, we conclude that the choice was too hard to have ex-
pected the defendant to resist. Although the agent may have
breached an expectation we accept, we think it is unfair to
blame and punish her, because the choice to do the right thing
was too hard to make under the circumstances. The law re-
quires that the threat be made by a human being, but why
should it matter whether the threat is made by another person
or arises as a result of naturally occurring, impersonal circum-
stances?
Imagine the following scenarios, which I borrow from a
leading criminal law casebook.0 In the first, a driver is negotiat-
ing a steep, narrow mountain road, with great precipices on
both sides. A gunslinger is holding a gun to her head, urging
her on. As they come around the curve, two people loom
ahead, lying unconscious in the middle of the road. There is no
way to go around them. The gunslinger orders the driver at
pain of death to drive over the people, which will surely kill
them. If the driver accedes, she has the possibility of succeeding
with the hard choice excuse of duress in jurisdictions that allow
'9 See ROBERT NozicK, THE NATURE OF RATIONAI.Y 139-40 (1993) ("At present, we
have no adequate theory of the substantive rationality of goals and desires...").
2
0 SANFORD KADISH & STEPHENJ. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND I7S PROCESSES 905
(6th ed. 1995).
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the excuse in cases involving the taking of innocent life. Now
consider the same scenario, except that there is no gunslinger.
Instead, the driver's brakes fail, despite her completely consci-
entious maintenance of the vehicle. Either she must drive over
the people, surely killing them, or to avoid them, she must go
over the side of the precipice and fall to a certain death herself.
If an excuse is possible in the first case, it ought to be available
in the second.
Moreover, why should a threat of death or grievous bodily
harm be necessary, as the law now requires? People of reason-
able firmness are more likely to find such threats too hard to
bear, compared to threats of lesser physical and psychological
harm, but why exclude the latter a priorn? Consider a person
who possesses a financially worthless object-say, a cheap me-
mento from her deceased, beloved parent-that is of supreme
psychological importance to the person. Now a desperado
threatens to destroy the memento unless the person destroys
more valuable property or inflicts some form of physical harm
on another. It is at least morally thinkable that, depending on
the degree of the other harm, a rational person of reasonable
firmness might yield.
Agents who appear to be incapable of reasonable firmness
present an apparently problematic case for the hard choice ex-
cuse. An easy choice for most people may be subjectively very
difficult for them. Consider a coward who is threatened with a
hard punch unless she kills someone. Although virtually every-
one, including cowardly types, would choose to be the victim of
a punch rather than to kill, some people might find the threat
of a punch as terrifying and coercive as a death threat.
How should such cases be analyzed? Remember, to begin,
that the "person of reasonable firmness" standard does not
mean that everyone who is not dispositionally of reasonable
firmness will be excused. The standard is normative. Those
who are fortunate enough to be especially brave and those who
are of average braveness will be able to meet it quite readily.
Those who are of less than average dispositional firmness will
have more trouble resisting when they should. Still, if we judge
that the person had the general capacity to comply with the rea-
sonable firmness standard, even if it is harder for her than for
most, then she will be held responsible if she yields when a per-
son of reasonable firmness would have resisted. This is true of
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most objective standards in the law: People with less than aver-
age ability to meet standards are still held to that standard if
they are generally capable of meeting them. The legal result
comports with common sense and ordinary morality. When
important moral expectations are involved-e.g., be careful; do
not harm others under weakly threatening conditions-we be-
lieve it is fair to expect fellow citizens capable of meeting rea-
sonable standards to comply.
21
What should be done, however, with the person we do not
think capable of complying, such as the extreme coward who is
placed in the threatening situation through no fault of her own?
Justice demands an excuse in such cases, but on what theory?
One possibility is that the person's general capacity for rational-
ity is disabled. For example, the fear of bodily injury may be so
morbid that any threat creates anxiety sufficient to block the
person's capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason. An-
other way of analyzing the case is as an example of "internal
hard choice." The threat that creates the hard choice is not of
the lesser physical harm itself; instead it is the threat of such su-
premely dysphoric inner states-terror, for example-that ren-
ders the choice so hard for this agent.22 A model of hard choice
created by the threat of internal dysphoria may be the best ex-
planation of why we might want to excuse in an array of cases
that are often thought to require a "volitional" or control ex-
cuse, such as the pedophile, pyromaniac, compulsive gambler,
drug "addict," and similar cases. In all these cases of alleged
compulsion, the predisposition causes intense desires, the frus-
tration of which threatens the agent with great dysphoria. Per-
haps a person of reasonable firmness faced with sufficient
dysphoria would yield. In sum, if an excuse is to obtain in the
case of the coward or the other cases mentioned, once again,
the generic incapacity for rationality or hard choice will explain
why we might want to excuse.
Although the internal hard choice model is plausible and
competing explanations that rely on so-called volitional prob-
lems are confused or lack empirical support,2 I prefer to ana-
2 H.LA. Hart, Neglignce, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibihly, in HART, supra note 12,
at 136, 152-54.
"' I have explored such a model for inner coercion at length elsewhere. Stephen J.
Morse, Culpability and Contro4 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1619-34 (1994).
2Id. at 1658-59.
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lyze these cases in terms of irrationality. At the most practical
level, it will often be too difficult to assess the degree of threat-
ened dysphoria that creates the hard choice. Assessing the ca-
pacity for rationality is not an easy task, but it is a more common
sense assessment of the sort we make every day. Second, it is
simply not clear that the fear of dysphoria would ever be suffi-
cient to excuse the breach of important expectations, except in
precisely those cases in which we would assume naturally that
the agent's rational capacity was essentially disabled.
I have argued that irrationality--defined to include the ca-
pacity for empathy and guilt-and hard choice are the essential
excusing conditions. A rational agent not faced with a hard
choice may fairly be blamed and punished if she breaches an
expectation we accept. It is not hard to understand why irra-
tionality and hard choice are excusing conditions. Either con-
dition will make it too hard for the agent properly to follow the
rule, and to comply with the expectation, because she will be
unable either to grasp or to be guided by the good reasons not
to offend.
Perhaps there should be other conditions required for re-
sponsibility in addition to the general capacity for rationality
and the absence of a hard choice. Many variables may make it
easier or harder for the agent to meet moral obligations. 24 It is
harder to conform to the requirements of morality and the
criminal law if an agent has characteristics that predispose to ob-
jectionable behavior and lacks characteristics that are self-
protective. Impulsivity and hot temper are examples of the
former; successful self-control strategies and good judgment are
examples of the latter. An agent with many of the worrisome
characteristics and few of the self-protective variables will surely
be at greater risk for breaching expectations, especially if cir-
cumstances are provoking or tempting. If an agent lacks protec-
tive predispositions and is exposed to a criminogenic
environment, it will, all else equal, be considerably harder for
the agent to avoid offending than for a person who is more for-
tunately endowed and exposed to a more benign environment.
But not all variables that make it harder to behave rightly
are prerequisites for responsibility. Even a combination of un-
2' See ia at 1605-10 (discussing variables that make it harder or easier for the agent to
"fly straight").
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fortunate dispositions and situational variables will not necessar-
ily excuse. A hot-blooded person who is sorely, but inadequately
provoked (as a legal matter), will not have an excuse if she kills
the provoker, even if she both lacks self-control and appears out
of control.25 Morality and the law alike set a minimum standard
for what is required for responsible action and not everything
that would help an agent to behave well is or should be in-
cluded in the standard. As long as an agent possesses the mini-
mum requirements for normative competence, she is capable of
meeting moral obligations, and it is not unfair to hold her re-
sponsible, even if it is harder for some people than for others.
Moreover, the justice of holding people to high standards of re-
gard for. the rights and interests of others is especially warranted
in cases involving serious harmdoing, because such situations
give agents the strongest possible reasons to avoid breaching
moral expectations. Proponents who claim that other variables
should be included in the criteria of responsibility and excuse
mustjustify such inclusion with a robust moral theory.
Although the bad luck of lacking self-protective variables
and being exposed to highly criminogenic situations should
generate sympathy and caution before blaming and punishing,
variability of good fortune is an inevitable aspect of the human
condition. Bad luck is not an excuse unless it produces an ex-
cusing condition, such as lack of normative competence. Anger
at harmdoers and sympathy for victims should not lead us to
overestimate the normative competence of harmdoers, but
sympathy for harmdoers should also not lead us to underesti-
mate their normative competence.
The view of responsibility I have presented is not necessarily
an all-or-none, bright line concept. There can be almost infi-
nite degrees of normative competence or hardness of choice,
and correspondingly, in principle, responsibility could be ar-
rayed along an almost infinitely subdivided continuum. But
human beings are epistemologically incapable of evaluating the
criteria for responsibility with such subtle precision. Thus, the
law does adopt a bright line test. But rough mitigating doc-
2See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 6, at 654-55 (reduction of murder to manslaugh-
ter possible only if defendant is provoked by circumstances that would create "heat of
passion" in a reasonable person). Modem requirements for "adequate" provocation
are softening, however, permitting reduction to manslaughter in a wide range of
cases. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (b) (1962).
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trines are possible and may be the appropriate vehicles for ad-
dressing the moral relevance of those variables that make "flying
straight" harder. I have argued that, for just this reason, the law
should adopt a generic, mitigating partial excuse.26 If mitigation
is justified in an individual case, however, it must be because the
genuine criteria for excuse-irrationality and hard choice-are
sufficiently, albeit not fully, present. Thus, criminogenic pre-
dispositions will be relevant only if they compromise the general
capacity for normative competence. If they do, a strong case for
mitigation obtains.
D. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR EXCUSE
I have argued that the incapacity for rationality and hard
choice are the excusing conditions that best account for the
moral and legal world that we have and that they provide a co-
herent and justifiable account of our practices. However, many
alternative explanations have been given. Most of these, in my
opinion, are either incorrect, confusing, question-begging, or
conclusory. This subsection explores these alternatives so that
we can clearly focus on the proper issues for analysis of juvenile
responsibility.
1. Determinism/Universal Causation is Not the Issue
The most common alternative general explanation for the
excuses is that the defendant's conduct was "determined" or
"caused." Such claims are often made in the idiom of lack of
"free will:" The defendant should be excused, it is alleged, be-
cause she lacked free will. Thus, kids should be excused be-
cause they lack free will. Although such locutions are indeed
common, I claim, in contrast, that these alternatives do not ex-
plain the excuses we have, nor do they represent a coherent
theory that could explain the excuses.
There is no consensually accepted meaning of determinism,
but a typical understanding is that the laws of the universe and
antecedent events together determine all future events. In
brief, as a result of the inexorable laws of the universe and given
the antecedent events, only one outcome is lawfully possible.
Many people assume that this is true, at least at levels higher
2 StephenJ. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuses, in CRIME ANDJUS CE (Michael Tonry
ed., forthcoming 1998).
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than the explanation of subatomic particles, and it is certainly
the background assumption of many working scientists.
The simplest reason why the theoretical truth of determin-
ism does not explain the excuses we have is that determinism is
true or not, "all the way down." If the truth of determinism
were the defining characteristic for responsibility, then everyone
or no one would be responsible. Consider the following exam-
ples. If determinism is true, then children and adults are
equally determined creatures. Yet we only generally excuse
children. It is metaphysically preposterous to believe that chil-
dren are determined, but somehow determinism loosens its
grasp on human beings as they mature. The genuine reason
human beings are considered more responsible as they mature
is that they become more rational. The behavior of legally crazy
people is no more or less determined by the laws of the universe
and antecedent events than the behavior of people without dis-
orders. The former are simply less rational. People who accede
to a threat made with a gun at their head are no more deter-
mined than the desperado making the threat; the former faces a
choice too hard to bear; the latter does not. As P.F. Strawson
argued in his pathbreaking article, Freedom and Resentment, the
theoretical truth of determinism cannot account for the excuses
we have. 7
2. Causation is Not an Excuse
A related argument, subject to similar defects, is that if sci-
ence or common sense identifies a cause for human action, in-
cluding mental or physical disorders or developmental
variables, then the conduct is necessarily excused. I refer to this
mistaken belief as the "fundamental psycholegal error:" Causa-
tion is neither an excuse per se nor the equivalent of compul-
sion, which is an excusing condition. For example, suppose that
I politely ask the brown-haired members of an audience of
criminologists and criminal lawyers to whom I am speaking to
raise their hands to assist me with a demonstration. As I know
from experience, virtually all the brunet(te)s will raise their
hands, and I will thank them politely. These hand-raisings are
clearly caused by a variety of variables over which the bru-
27 Peter F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentmen, in FREE WiL 59-80 (Gary Watson ed.,
1982).
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net(te)s have no control, including genetic endowment (being
brown-haired is a genetically determined, but-for cause of the
behavior) and, most proximately, my words. Equally clearly, this
conduct is human action-intentional bodily movement-and
not simply the movements of bodily parts in space, as if, for ex-
ample, a neurological disorder produced a similar arm-rising.
Moreover, the conduct is entirely rational and uncompelled.
The cooperating audience members reasonably desire that the
particular lecture they are attending should be useful to them.
They reasonably believe that cooperating with the invited lec-
turer at a professional meeting will help satisfy that desire. So,
they form the intention to raise their hands and they do so.
It is hard to imagine more completely rational conduct, ac-
cording to any normative notion of rationality. The hand-
raisings were not compelled, because the audience was not
threatened with any untoward consequences whatsoever for
failure to cooperate. In fact, the lecturer's request to partici-
pate was more like an offer, an opportunity to make oneself bet-
ter off by improving the presentation's effectiveness. Offers
provide easy choices and more freedom, rather than hard
choices and less freedom.8
The cooperative audience members are clearly responsible
for their hand-raisings and fully deserve my "Thank you," even
though their conduct was perfectly predictable and every bit as
caused as a neuropathologically-induced arm-rising. Although
the conduct is caused, there is no reason consistent with exist-
ing moral and legal excuses that it should be excused.
All phenomena of the universe are presumably caused by
the necessary and sufficient conditions that produce them. If
causation were an excuse, no one would be responsible for any
conduct and society would not be concerned with moral and le-
gal responsibility and excuse. Indeed, eliminative materialists,
among others, often make such assertions,2 but such a moral
and legal world is not the one we have. Although neuropa-
thologically-induced arm-raisings and co-operative, intentional
2sALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 204-11 (1987) (distinguishing threats from offers
and discussing different methods of setting baselines to make the distinction).
2 See, e.g., PAUL CHURCHLAND, THE ENGINE OF REASON: THE SEAT OF THE SOUL: A
PHILOSOPHICALJOURNEY INTO THE BRAIN 309-14 (1995). B.F. Skinner made the same
point from a radical behaviorist point of view. See B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND
DIGNITY60-82 (1971) (ascribing all "control" to the environment).
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hand-raisings are equally caused, they are distinguishable phe-
nomena, and the difference is vital to our conception of our-
selves as human beings. In a moral and legal world that
encompasses both responsible and excused action, all of which
is caused, the discrete excusing conditions that should and do
negate responsibility are surely caused by something. Neverthe-
less, it is the nature of the excusing condition that is doing the
work, not that the excusing condition is caused.
The reductio that everyone or no one is responsible if the
truth of determinism or universal causation underwrites respon-
sibility is often attacked in two ways. The first is "selective de-
terminism" or "selective causation"-i.e., the claim that only
some behavior is caused or determined and only that subset of
behavior should be excused. The metaphysics of selective cau-
sation is wildly implausible, however. If this is a causal universe,
then it strains the imagination also to believe that some human
behavior somehow exits the "causal stream." Moreover, just be-
cause we possess the scientific understanding to explain and
predict some events more fully than others, it does not follow
that the former are more determined or caused. And compara-
tive lack of causal or predictive knowledge about behavior is not
an excusing condition in any case. The reason that we excuse
children is not because we understand the causal antecedents of
their conduct more thoroughly than the antecedents of adult
behavior or that we can predict their behavior more accurately
than we can predict adult behavior. To explain in detail why se-
lective causation/selective excuse is an unconvincing and ulti-
mately patronizing argument would require a lengthy digression
from this essay's primary purpose. I have made the argument in
detail elsewhere3 0 and shall simply assert here that good argu-
ments do not support this position.
The second attack on the causal reductio claims that only
abnormal causes, including psychopathological and physiopa-
thological variables, excuse. Although this argument appears
closer to the truth, it, too, is unpersuasive. Pathology can pro-
duce an excusing condition, but when it does, the excusing
condition pathology causes does the analytic work, not the exis-
tence of a pathological cause per se. Consider again the delu-
so See StephenJ. Morse, Psychology, Determinism and Lega Responsibility, in THE LAW AS A
BEHAvIoRAL INsTRUmENT 35, 50-54 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986).
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sional self-defender, who kills in response to the delusionally
mistaken belief that she is about to be killed. Such a killing is
no more caused or determined than a killing motivated by any
belief that one's life is endangered by a presumed unlawful ag-
gressor. Crazy beliefs are no more compelling than non-crazy
beliefs. A non-delusional but unreasonably mistaken self-
defender, who feels the same desire to save her own life, would
have no excuse for killing. Once again, we excuse the former
but not the latter because only the delusional defender is inca-
pable of rational conduct. Finally, consider infancy as an ex-
cuse. There is nothing abnormal about normal childhood, yet
normal children are not held fully responsible. What the delu-
sional defender and the child have in common is not "patho-
logical causation;" they have in common the absence of full
capacity for normative competence. Normative incompetence
is the genuine excusing condition that is operative.
3. "Free Will" is Not the Issue
The next, unconvincing claim for excuse, which is related
to but distinct from claims about determinism or causation,
concerns "free will." Courts and commentators routinely claim
that excused defendants lacked "free will," but I believe that this
is virtually always just a placeholder for the conclusion that the
actor supposedly lacking this desirable attribute ought to be ex-
cused. To understand the argument better requires that we first
examine the concept of the "will."
Non-reductive theories of action uncontroversially posit that
people act for reasons that are rationalized by desire/belief sets.
Human action is based on practical reason. But it is notoriously
true that practical syllogisms are not deductive. A person may
have a desire/belief set that seemingly should ensue in a par-
ticular basic action, but the person may not act at all. When the
person does act, how do desires, beliefs and intentions lead to
the bodily movements that we call voluntary acts? This is the
mystery that the theory of the will or volition seeks to explain.
In brief, an "operator" is necessary to get us from here-desires,
beliefs and intentions-to there-a bodily movement that will
successfully (we hope) satisfy our desires through action.
Theories of the will or volition have waxed and waned in re-
cent philosophy. For a short period, under the influence of
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Gilbert Ryle,5 ' the concept of the will was considered preposter-
ous by the majority of action theorists, but in recent years, some
such concept has become central to accounts of voluntary ac-
tion. 2 Some think that volitions are actions of the will;3 some
treat the will or volition as simply another type of intention or
trying.3 4 Michael Moore argues that the will or volition is a func-
tional mental state that translates desires, beliefs, and more
general intentions into "basic" actions, including resolving con-
flicts between intentions.3M This and similar functional accounts
emphatically reject equating volitions with wants.36 In sum,
modem theories treat the will in one fashion or another as an
executory function.
Once one understands the meaning of the will or volition, it
becomes apparent that the excuses are not based on a defective
will, understood as an executory functional state. The victim of
a threat of death or a delusional self-defender who kills to save
her own life are both able to execute the actions that will, re-
spectively, save them from genuine or delusionally-feared
death.37 People acting under duress, or as a result of mental
disorder, and juveniles are all able to execute their more gen-
eral intentions. Even if an actor's body is literally forced to
move despite her strong desire to remain still, there is no defect
or problem of the will, as there is simply no intention to execute
and no act to excuse. Agents can be physically forced or psycho-
logically compelled to act against their desires, or they can be ir-
rational, but the executory state remains intact. Even in cases of
so-called "weakness of the will,3'' the best explanation of an
,GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF THE MIND 62-69 (1949).
"See infra sources in notes 33-36.
See CARL GnIET, ON ACTION 31 (1990) (noting that "will comes as close as any" verb
to describing volition).
See ALFRED R. MELE, SPRINGS OF ACTION: UNDERSTANDING INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOR
193 (1992) (noting that volitions "are not actions" but are "proximal intentions").
" MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACt AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 113-65 (1993). Moore claims that the functional
mental state that does the work is an "intention," what he terms a "bare intention," which
"executes our more general plans into discrete bodily movements." Id. at 121.
Id. at 120 (observing that "it is ... not plausible to treat volitions as wants of any
kind"); GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF 66-67 (1986) (noting that Kant believed
that "one possesses a will that is... a faculty distinct from desire" (citation omitted)).
37 Se HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABnIIs AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBIrrY 55-65 (1979).
's See JuSTIN GOSLING, WEAKNESS OF THE WILL (1990) (historical and conceptual
overview).
1997]
STEPHENJ. MORSE
agent's acting contrary to his or her strongest desire, belief or
intention is that the agent's action is clearly the intentional
product of a well-functioning will. s9
In some of these cases, of course, we say colloquially that the
agent's will was overborne in the sense that either the agent was
forced to move or felt that she "had to" act contrary to her pref-
erences, or that the will was operating in response to irrational
reasons for action. But this is a misleading, metaphorical locu-
tion. As noted, volitions are not wants or desires; on the best
theory they are a species of intention. In the cases of no act and
irrational and compelled action alike, moving or acting contrary
to other desires, beliefs or intentions does not entail a problem
with the will. Nonetheless, for various reasons some people un-
deniably seem to lack self-control, either more generally or in
specific contexts. For example, juveniles may find it harder
than adults to resist peer pressure, even in situations when it is
clear to them that they ought to resist. These people find it
more difficult to behave themselves and are more disposed to
offend. Still, the problem is not a defect in the will as an execu-
tory state of bare intention. The problem lies elsewhere. °
We are now ready to return to the discussion of lack of "free
will" as the general explanation for the excuses. In almost all
instances, however, the assertion that lack of free will excuses
cannot correctly mean either that there is a defect in the agent's
executory mental functioning or that action is irrational or
39 See MooRE, supra note 35, at 140-41 (noting that agents "intentionally do acts that
flout their strongest desires").
" One possible exception to the conclusion that out-of-control agents have intact wills
might be cases in which there is a duty to act and the agent wants to do her duty, but she
is psychologically paralyzed. I have never encountered ajudicial opinion addressing this
issue. Nor, I suspect, does it occur often in ordinary life. Still, such a case is surely
possible. Imagine a parent with a pathological fear of open spaces, so-called
"agoraphobia." He totally encloses and child-proofs the yard of the house so that his
toddler can safely play unsupervised in the yard. Despite his admirable caution, the
toddler one day suffers some obvious, untoward event, such as a seizure, that requires
immediate attention. The parent wants to rush out to help the child-i.e., there is no
conflict of desire, belief or intention whatsoever-but he experiences "paralysis" and is
thus "unable" to assist. We can even imagine that by brute force of will he goes to the
door and starts to go out, but anxiety and its psychophysiological concomitants cause
him to faint. Our hapless parent plausibly suffers from a volitional defect that interfered
with his desire to do his duty. Truly he could not help himself. But if we were to exempt
him from responsibility, note that the basis would be lack of action, not a control excuse.
Note, too, that this case is recharacterizable as an irrationality problem if, as seems
plausible, the father's groundless fear of open spaces is deemed irrational.
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compelled solely because it is determined or the product of uni-
versal causation. In a deterministic or universally caused world,
some people are irrational and others are not; some face hard
choices and others do not. Moreover, if determinism or causa-
tion is true and inconsistent with free will, then no one has this
quality (or the opposite) and no one is responsible (or everyone
is). Often, I believe, the "unfree" will claim is used rhetorically
to buttress an insufficiently supported conclusion that the agent
under consideration ought to be excused, because we all "know"
that free will is a necessary component of, and perhaps suffi-
cient for, moral and legal responsibility. However, this move
creates a tautology. And a conclusory label, no matter how
rhetorically powerful, does not provide justifications and criteria
for excuse.
A more promising approach, although daunting, would be
to enter the highly-contested, technical free will literature to see
what can be made of the claim that lack of free will underwrites
excusing. For example, one might say that only agents capable
of rational self-reflection on their reasons for action possess free
will, 41 and it is precisely this capacity that excused agents lack.
Or, one might say that agents acting under certain constraints,
such as threats or strong, unwanted desires-just the types of
conditions that often lead to claims for compulsion excuses-
lack free will. 42 This article previously addressed such arguments
and suggested that irrationality is the basic excusing condition,
but note that such arguments are, once again, not addressed to
defects in the agent's narrowly conceived executory functioning,
nor to problems that the truth of determinism might create.
Rather, they are claims about the proper criteria for the moral
responsibility of intentional agents; they are decidedly not about
automatons, mechanisms, or the lack of some desirable attrib-
ute or condition such as "free will."
In sum, trying to underpin excusing in terms of will or voli-
tional problems or lack of free will is likely to be inaccurate,
confusing, rhetorical, or in its best incarnation, a placeholder
"' See, e.g., WAllACE, supra note 11, at 157-59; Randolph Clark, Free Will and the
Conditions of Moral Responsibility, 66 PHIL. STUD. 53, 54-55 (1992). But see Richard
Double, How Rational Must Free WillBe2, 23 METAPHILOSOPHY 268,277-78 (1992).
Se', e.g., Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in TIE
IMPORTANCE oF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 11, 24 (Harry G. Frankfurt ed., 1988) (claiming
that "[a] person's will is free only if he is free to have the will he wants").
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for a fuller, more adequate theory of excusing conditions. The
will and free will are not legal criteria, and we would do well to
dispense with employing them in responsibility analysis and at-
tribution.
4. Lack of Intent is Not the Issue
Another claim is that excused agents lack "intent." Once
again, if "intent" is a conclusory term that means "blameworthi-
ness," "culpability" or the like, it is unexceptionable, but the
conclusion does no analytic work. However, if intent is more
properly treated as a mental state, the absence of which might
excuse, then this claim is incorrect as a general explanation of
excusing. Indeed, it is apparent that excused action is inten-
tional, even in the most extreme cases in which morality and law
alike hold that an excuse is fully justified. Remember, we are
considering cases of action, not bodily movements resulting
from irresistible mechanism or literal physical compulsion.
Consider cases of duress in which the agent is threatened with
death unless he or she does the wrong thing.3 The agent com-
pelled to act by such threats clearly acts intentionally to do the
alternative, rather than to face destruction. The agent's oppor-
tunity set is wrongfully and drastically limited in such conditions
and we would surely excuse her, but not because she lacked in-
tent. She acted fully intentionally to save her life. Even young
children clearly act intentionally, to further their desires in light
of their beliefs. For further support, consider the American
Psychiatric Association's generic definition of "compulsive be-
havior"-for which morality and the law might wish to provide a
compulsion excuse-as "intentional" and "purposeful.",44 And
consider again our delusional self-defender. She kills for irra-
tional reasons, but she surely does so intentionally in the delu-
sionally mistaken belief that she needs to do so to save her own
life. And so on. Action is by definition intentional and is not
excused because it is unintentional.
'- I am assuming that under some conditions duress operates as an excuse. Others
contend that even if the balance of evils is negative, the agent's conduct is justified if
yielding to the threat is reasonable. See WALLACE, supra note 11, at 145-46.
4 AMERICAN PSYCHAT~iC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 423 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
[Vol. 88
IMMATURITY & IRRESPONSIBILITY
5. The Capacity for Choice is Not the Issue
Some claim that responsibility resides in the ability to
choose, and that excuses are based generally on a lack of the
ability to choose or a lack of choice.4 Philosophers of mind and
action dispute the precise contours of choosing, understood as
an agent's mental act,46 but the technical intricacies of the con-
cept are not central to the ordinary language notion that might
underpin excusing generally. Nonetheless, even ordinary ac-
counts of the concept of choice can be ambiguous. Understood
as a mental act, sometimes it seems to refer to the act of decid-
ing between (at least two) alternative courses of action (or non-
action). Other times, choice as a mental act seems to be syn-
onymous with acting intentionally ("I chose to go out for ice
cream"). In the alternative, choice sometimes refers to a feature
of the agent's world that might be described as the alternative
courses of action, the opportunities to act differently, that were
available. If you are in a jail cell, for example, you can choose
among and act on many alternative courses of action open to
you at most moments: you can sit on your bed, stand up, walk
around, sing, listen to the radio, and so on; but you can not
choose to go out for ice cream. Let us consider these ordinary
uses of choice to understand why lack of choice or opportunity
is an inaccurate or potentially confusing general justification for
excusing.
Neither mental act usage is promising as a general founda-
tion. Virtually all agents seem unproblematically able to choose
between alternatives. If there is a gun at one's head, one may
find it exceedingly easy to choose to accede to the wrongful
death threat. Juveniles, too, choose between alternatives, al-
though their lack of experience and knowledge may prevent
them from fully recognizing the choices available. 47
45 See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAY iN THE CIMiNAL LAW
85-88 (1987).
41 Compare MlcHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS AND PRACncAL REASON 165
(1987) (suggesting that "intention is tied to further reasoning and action in ways in
which choice need not be; that is why we do not intend everything that is an element in
what we choose"), with MELE, supra note 34, at 140-41, 152 n.16 (noting that when
deciding to perform an act, one also has the intention to perform the act). Such dispute
about "choice" is unsurprising because the contours of all mental furniture are similarly
contested.
7 The same point can, of course, be made about many adults.
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In some cases, a non-culpably ignorant or irrational agent
may not be aware that a choice is possible. One might then
claim that the agent does lack the ability to make a choice. Al-
though this is not an implausible claim, note that it is entirely
parasitic on other standard exculpatory conditions-ignorance
and the excuse of irrationality-which are doing all the work.
In other cases, the agent might claim that the irresistibility of a
desire deprived her of the capacity to make a choice. Again,
such a characterization is plausible. But, assuming the validity
of the claim about the strength of the desire, it seems more ac-
curate to say, like the case of the agent acting under duress, that
she was psychologically compelled to make the hard choice
"threatened" by the strength of the desire. She did, after all,
choose to yield to the desire. She intentionally yielded. Indeed,
the strength of the desire made her choice easy, and if she
struggled with conflict about yielding, this underscores the
presence of the capacity to choose. The American Psychiatric
Association's generic definition of "compulsive behavior" as
"aimed at preventing or reducing distress or preventing some
dreaded event or situation ,18 again further supports the conclu-
sion that the agent is able to exercise choice. Even if conflict
remains "unresolved," agents are able to exercise and imple-
ment choice.49 In "irresistible desire" cases, then, the agent
chooses, but in a hard choice situation. And if the terror of the
choice set renders the agent "unable to think," such that no
"choice" is possible, this is a rationality defect.
As a synonym for lack of intentional action, the other men-
tal act notion-lack of choice as the basis for excusing-suffers
from the same defects identified in the discussion above of the
will and intention. Excused agents, including juveniles, act in-
tentionally, so they "choose" their acts in this sense. In sum,
lack of mental capacity to make a choice will not furnish a gen-
eral justification for the excuses.
Lack of choice as lack of alternatives or opportunity is more
promising, but this meaning can be both literal and metaphori-
cal; to avoid the ever-present lure of mechanism, one must dis-
tinguish the two. On occasion, literally no relevant alternative
4 DSM-IV, supra note 44, at 423.
41 ISAAC LvEI, HARD CHOICES: DECISION MAKING UNDER UNRESOLVED CoNFuIcT 34
(1986).
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action is open to an agent, such as in cases of literally irresistible
physical compulsion. But such compulsion defeats the prima
facie requirements of criminal liability, which include a volun-
tary act. These are not the standard cases of excuse.
Those wishing to draw the analogy to examples of no literal
choice claim that the agent had no "real" choice, or no reason-
able choice. Indeed, we talk this way colloquially all the time.
In brief, a hard choice is assimilated to no choice. For example,
the person acting under sufficient duress has a choice-she
might refuse to harm another, despite the awfulness of the
threat-but she is a non-culpable victim of a wrongfully imposed
hard choice and we can not fairly expect her not to yield. For
another example, juveniles often may not fully recognize the
options that are available. But, once again, ignorance or irra-
tionality is the more fundamental excusing condition in this
case.
Hard choice cases in which we cannot expect the agent to
behave differently undeniably exist, but note that what does the
excusing work is not a failure to choose. Instead, we are making
a moral judgment about when options are so wrongfully or non-
culpably constrained that it is simply not fair to require the
agent to behave otherwise. It is not that the agent literally was
physically forced to do wrong and thus literally had no choice.
Rather, as a moral matter, we might excuse because the choice
the agent faced was too hard. Finally, even if hard choice situa-
tions explain why some agents might be excused, many agents
we excuse, such as children and many people with severe men-
tal disorder, are neither objectively nor subjectively in hard
choice situations. Hard choice does not mean that the agent
lacks the capacity to exercise choice and it fails to furnish a gen-
eral justification for excusing.
To understand more fully the difference between cases of
genuine "no choice" and hard choice/irresistible impulse cases
that produce human action, consider the following example."
Imagine that a person is hanging by the fingernails from the
edge of a cliff and cannot pull himself back up. Depending on
strength, the agent can hang on for some time, but ultimately
'0 The discussion that follows is also relevant to the discussions of the will and of in-
tention, supra at notes 31-43 and accompanying text, and of self-control, infra at notes
51-58 and accompanying text.
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he will fall. Hard choices and so-called irresistible impulses are
allegedly like the pull of gravity in this example. To see why the
analogy fails, however, imagine that another agent stands at the
edge of a cliff with a gun and tells the hapless cliffhanger that if
the cliffhanger starts to let go, the gunslinger will shoot and kill
the cliffhanger. Despite this dreadful threat, sooner or later, all
cliffhangers, no matter how strong they may be, will nonetheless
"let go," but the letting go will not be intentional, chosen hu-
man action. It will be the mechanical failure of the muscles to
operate under the combined influences of gravity, muscle fa-
tigue and the like. But now imagine that a similar gunslinger
remains always at, say, an addict's elbow and tells him that if he
tries to obtain or use the addictive substance, he will be killed
instantly. The addict will not buy or use. The cliffhanger's fall
is a genuine mechanism and not human action; it is ultimately
unmodifiable by reason. In contrast, drug buying and using
behavior is intentional, chosen human action and modifiable by
reason. If is not so modifiable, the agent is irrational, but still
not an "unintentional;" "unchoosing," "uncontrollable" mecha-
nism. Most arguments that facilely suggest that hard choices or
any other kind, are necessarily unchosen and therefore uncon-
trollable, are conceptually unsound.
I conclude that although colloquial talk about lack of
choice is commonly used to characterize many cases of excuse,
it is often inaccurate and potentially misleading, as when the
lure of mechanism leads to the conclusion that no difference
exists between cases of no literal choice and cases of hard
choice. Agents facing sufficiently hard choices should some-
times be excused, but not because they do not choose to do
what they do. These cases are better analyzed directly in terms
of ordinary justifications for excusing conditions, such as irra-
tionality and compulsion.
6. "Self-Control"
Finally, being "out of control" or lacking "self-control" is
sometimes offered as the general theory that justifies excusing.
Here, too, there is a grain of common sense truth, but properly
understood, this explanation does not account for the excuses
we have. Various intrapersonal and environmental variables
make it easier for a person to behave well. If anger-provoking
or evil-tempting situational variables never arise, one is both
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lucky and less likely to engage in harmdoing. It will be easier to
exert self-control and to be in control. And, all things being
equal, the reverse is also true. Similarly, if an agent has an even
temperament, moderate desires, lots of dispositional self-control
mechanisms at her disposal, plenty of empathy, and the like, she
is more likely to be in control and to control herself, even if
provoked or tempted to do wrong. Nonetheless, these observa-
tions are almost tautologically true and tell us little about excus-
ing in general. The excusing conditions I have identified,
irrationality and hard choice, make "controlling oneself' diffi-
cult, but not every variable that has this effect is a necessary
condition of responsibility. Hot temper, for example, may make
it harder for the easily-provoked agent to behave well, but virtu-
ally all such agents retain sufficient general normative compe-
tence to be held fully responsible. Too often, I contend, "lack
of self-control" or "out of control" is once again a synonym for
"lack of culpability." Those who make this claim need to pro-
vide a fuller theory of excusing and an account of why particular
variables ought to be included as excusing conditions.
A subset of the self-control claim that appears to exert a
hold on the popular, mental health and legal imagination is
cases of so-called "irresistible impulses." Although an "irresisti-
ble impulse" or a volitional or control test is not a currently fa-
vored insanity defense criterion,51 it remains a test in some
jurisdictions and its intuitive appeal continues. But even if such
a behavioral state as "irresistible impulse" exists in some cases, it
is not generalizable to explain the excuses, and, I claim, it is
once again reducible to irrationality or hard choice claims.
"Impulse control disorders" are an established category of
mental disorders,2 some of which, such as "intermittent explo-
sive disorder," kleptomania, pathological gambling, and pyro-
mania, may produce behavior for which the actor will seek an
excuse. Moreover, impulsive behavior is blamed for much
criminal conduct and other antisocial behavior. 3 Thus, there is
"' In the wake ofJohn W. Hinckley, Jr.'s acquittal by reason of insanity for the at-
tempted assassination of President Reagan in 1982, many jurisdictions, including
Congress, abolished the volitional or control test of legal insanity. See., e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 17(a) (federal insanity defense, which includes only a "cognitive" test).
' DSM-IV, supra note 44, at 609-21.
53 See, e.g., MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRiME
85-120 (1990); Willard L Johnson et al., Impulsive Behavior and Substance Abuse, in TH1
1997]
STE P-ENJ. MORSE
reason to believe that attention to problematic impulses and
impulsivity should shed light on excusing. Once again, how-
ever, although the basic concepts appear clearly relevant, the
potential for metaphor and confusion warrants caution.
Human beings incontrovertibly can be subject to momen-
tary and apparently capricious passions that leave them feeling
subjectively unfree and that seem to compromise their ability to
control themselves. Such fleeting passions are often termed
impulses and should be distinguished from cases in which such
impulses are dispositional, which are usually termed impulsive
or compulsive.54 Both impulses and compulsions are often
thought to have the potential for coercive motivational force.5
Such observations, however characterized, are within the do-
main of common sense. The question is how these common-
places bear on the general justifications for excusing.
Note, first, that the impulses under consideration are de-
sires, fleeting and unconsidered desires to be sure, but desires
nonetheless. If an agent acts to satisfy such a desire, doing so
will surely be an intentional act executed by an undeniably ef-
fective will, and there is no reason to believe that universal cau-
sation or determinism plays a special role in such cases. The
agent may have a strongly felt need to satisfy the impulse, but
why is this different from standard cases of people desiring to
fulfill momentary, strong desires? What would it mean to say
that such a desire was literally irresistible? The lure of mecha-
nism is clearly at work, but should be resisted. After all, why
should a powerful desire-really, really, really wanting some-
thing-be assimilated to the patellar reflex? One possibility is
that such impulses create a hard choice, but if so, hard choice
analysis will do the work. A more likely possibility is that un-
thinking action in response to thoughtless or ephemerally
thoughtful, momentary desires should be judged irrational in
IMPULSIVE CLIENT: THEORY, RESEARCH AND TREATMENT 225-46 (William G. McCown et
al. eds., 1993).
" See William G. McCown & Philip A. DeSimone, Impulses, Impulsivity, and Impulsive
Behaviors: A Historical Review of a Contemporary Issue, in THE JIMULSIVE CLIENT, supra note
53, at 3, 4.
" See GEORGE AINSIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF SUCCESSIVE
MOTIVATIONAL STATES WITHIN THE PERSON 205 (1992); DSM-IV, supra note 44, at 418,
609 (people suffering from compulsions feel "driven to perform" the compulsive
behavior, the essential feature of impulse control disorders is "failure to resist"
performing a harmful act).
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appropriate cases. But is such action better understood as irra-
tional or as simply non-rational? In any case, rationality prob-
lems and not some supposed irresistible quality of the desire
would be the ground for excuse when action is impulsive. Fur-
thermore, momentary irrationality is not inconsistent with the
general capacity for normative competence. Finally, even if im-
pulses do have coercive motivational force, it is impossible to
differentiate "irresistible" impulses from those simply not re-
sisted.
Impulsivity is a disposition or tendency to act with less fore-
thought or steeper time discounting than most people of similar
ability and knowledge.56 Dispositional impulsiveness is arguably
a feature of childhood and adolescence. Despite the apparent
consensus on the general definition, more specific criteria or
descriptions have proved elusive. 7 It is reasonable to assume,
however, that at least some people who meet the general defini-
tion dysfunctionally suffer generally negative consequences as a
result of impulsivity!5 8 For example, dispositional impulsiveness
may in part explain the higher accident rate among adolescents.
The assumption that dispositional impulsiveness can be dysfunc-
tional is also commonplace and raises questions about why a
disposition to act impulsively, as well as acting on an individual
impulse, should excuse. The dispositionally impulsive agent
surely acts intentionally, with an effective will, and not under
any particular influence of universal causation or determinism.
Like the agent acting in response to an individual impulse, the
dispositionally impulsive agent acting impulsively may experi-
ence a hard choice or act irrationally or non-rationally. But lit-
eral irresistibility will not be the operative variable to justify an
excuse. Moreover, once again, the dispositionally impulsive
agent surely has general normative competence and consider-
"' See Scott Dickman, Impulsivity and Information Proeesing, in THE INTULSIVE CLIENT,
supra note 53, at 151; McCown & DeSimone, supra note 54, at 4.
57 SeeJames D.A. Parker & t Michael Bagby, Impulsivity in Adults: A Critical Review of
Measurement Approaches, in IMetsmV I THEORY, ASSEssMENT AND TREATMENT 142, 14243
(Christopher D. Webster & Margaret A. Jackson eds., 1997) ("the lack of conceptual
clarity in the impulsivity construct has become a source of widespread confusion.... .");
McCown & DeSimone, supra note 54, at 5; see also Dickman, supra note 56, at 153
(claiming that many of the inconsistencies in the impulsivity literature can be resolved by
inferring the specific cognitive processes in which subjects differ).
See generally Scott Dickman, Functional and Dysfunctional Impuvi*.: Personality and
Cognitive Correlates, 58J. PERSONAIXY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 95 (1990).
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able experience with the drawbacks of his or her disposition
from which we can fairly expect the agent to learn.
The general intuition supporting an argument for excusing
the dispositionally impulsive agent is not that desires are irre-
sistible or that hard choice or irrationality exists. It is, instead,
that the agent has the misfortune to possess a character trait
that makes behaving oneself more difficult. However, character
rarely furnishes the basis for a legal excuse. The law assumes
that people who are characterologically thoughtless, careless,
pugnacious, excitable, cowardly, cruel, and the like have suffi-
cient general normative capacity to be held accountable if they
violate the law. True, it may be harder for such people to be-
have well, but the law assumes that they do not lack the ability to
do so, if they are minimally capable of rationality and did not
face a hard choice. Finally, if such characterological considera-
tions were the basis for excusing, it would be because we de-
cided as a normative matter that certain prophylactic
personality qualities were necessary for responsibility, not be-
cause the desires of characterologically disadvantaged agents
were uniquely "irresistible" or that such agents were generally
normatively incompetent.
In sum, being "out of control" is just a conclusory synonym
for lack of culpability that requires analysis to determine if it can
explain the excuses we have. It clearly is not a unifying theo-
retical explanation that explains all the excuses, except in an ex-
tremely loose, unhelpful sense. Either irrationality or hard
choice will explain those cases, such as "irresistible impulse," to
which it seems particularly to apply.
III. THE MORAL AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY OFJUVENILES
Part II of this paper provided an interpretation of the excus-
ing conditions and the practice of holding an agent morally re-
sponsible and blaming the agent. It challenged standard
alternative accounts and suggested that new proposals should be
justified according to a robust moral theory of responsibility and
excuse. This part first considers a common strategy for address-
ing the responsibility of juveniles: identifying an alleged differ-
ence between juveniles and adults and assuming that the
empirical difference makes a moral difference. Then, based on
the analysis of Part II, this Part suggests whyjuveniles may be in
general less morally responsible than adults and how the legal
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system and researchers can take practical account of such dif-
ferences.
A. BEGGING THE QUESTION
The question ofjuvenile responsibility is not simply whether
juveniles are generally different from adults. Surely they are in
many ways. The real issue is whether they are morally different,
and the resolution of that issue depends on whether a moral
theory we accept dictates that the variables that behaviorally dis-
tinguish juveniles should also diminish their responsibility. Dif-
ference is not necessarily diminution, after all, and to assume
otherwise is to beg the question.
A standard strategy reviews the research on the develop-
mental and psychosocial variables that apparently distinguish
juveniles from adults and identifies the approximate age at
which the distinction no longer seems to pertain. The explicit
or implicit conclusion is that many of these variables diminish
responsibility, but the conclusion is rarely supported by argu-
mentation. It is assumed, and that is the difficulty. Many of the
variables may seem to be attractive candidates for diminishing
responsibility, but until the argument is provided, we can have
little sense of the force of the assumption.
One possibility is that a proposed variable is reducible to
normative incompetence. The task in this case is to show why
the variable diminishes normative competence. The second
possibility is that the concept of normative competence should
be expanded so that the behavioral difference should make a
moral difference. The task here is to show why according to
some moral theory normative competence should be so ex-
panded. In both cases, a further task is to explain why adults
who are indistinguishable from juveniles should not be treated
the same as juveniles according to the moral theory that treats
juveniles as a class differently.
For example, ifjuveniles are not rational, it is a simple mat-
ter to explain why they are not responsible. We already excuse
adults who are sufficiently irrational. But, to take a common
example, suppose juveniles as a class are more subject to peer
pressure than adults. This does not appear to raise a problem
with an agent's general capacity for normative competence, but
should it excuse the agent for some other reason? If so, is there
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good reason not to excuse the smaller proportion of adults who
may be as subject to peer pressure as the average juvenile?
A related question that is often begged is the moral and le-
gal relevance of the observation that juveniles are allegedly
more changeable than adults, either through normal develop-
mental processes or through interventional strategies. Adoles-
cence is a stage of dynamic psychological change and for this
and other reasons juveniles may be especially amenable to
treatment. Many self-protective variables may be precisely those
that undergo developmental change and that can be strength-
ened. It is assumed without question that the assumed differen-
tial plasticity of juveniles should affect our moral and legal
response. But the proper response to juvenile offenders de-
pends entirely on our theories ofjustification for intervention in
their lives. If we believe that pure retributivism should guide
our response, everything will depend on moral responsibility; if
we are pure consequentialists, moral responsibility is of no con-
sequence; if we are mixed theorists, desert is a necessary condi-
tion for punishment and sets limits, but it is not sufficient for
punitive intervention. Juvenile delinquency jurisdiction and ad-
judication thus needs a theory of intervention in general and a
theory of punishment in particular. Otherwise, a focus on par-
ticular variables as necessitating a particular intervention once
again begs the question.
If responsibility is treated as a matter of retrospective moral
evaluation, as I suggested it essentially is and should be, then
the plasticity or amenability to treatment of a variable is irrele-
vant to whether it diminishes moral responsibility. Responsibil-
ity should be mitigated or excused if a variable that diminishes
responsibility was operative at the time of harmdoing, whether
or not this characteristic is alterable, and vice versa. It is hard to
imagine what moral theory would suggest that plasticity per se
should reduce responsibility. To the extent that fault is a neces-
sary or sufficient condition for full responsibility, plasticity is ir-
relevant. Thus, a pure retributivist can justify full negative
sanctions for a fully responsible juvenile, even if the juvenile will
grow out of the characteristic that predisposed her to wrongdo-
ing. Similarly, the pure retributivist can justify lesser sanctions
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for a partially responsible juvenile, even if she will not grow out
of the characteristic that predisposes her to criminal conduct. 9
Plasticity might be highly relevant, however, to a mixed or
purely consequential theory of punishment or social interven-
tion. Thus, according to a mixed theory, specific prevention
may justify a less punitive response for a fully responsible juve-
nile wrongdoer, say, shorter incarceration. The lesser punish-
ment is perhaps justified either because she will mature or
because it is easier to alter her antisocial tendencies, but the le-
nience will not be based on diminished desert. Or, if one is a
purely consequential theorist, on general and specific preven-
tion grounds, one could justify lengthier incarceration for a par-
tially responsible but highly dangerous juvenile who is unlikely
to change for the better.
In sum, the relevance of plasticity depends on the theory of
intervention in the lives of juvenile offenders that guides our
moral and legal response to them. With these considerations in
mind, we are ready to turn to the question of the moral respon-
sibility ofjuveniles.
B. THE CRITERIA FORJUVENILE RESPONSIBILITY
This section considers the moral responsibility of adoles-
cents from an explicitly retrospective, morally evaluative stance.
In other words, it explores the degree to which adolescents can
fairly be blamed and punished for their wrongdoing on the
ground of moral desert. A consistent strategy of this section is
to examine the law's response to adult offenders who possess ju-
venile characteristics and to consider whether juveniles who are
morally like adults should be treated as juvenile and whether
adults who are morally like juveniles should be treated as adults.
The section does not address the good consequences that might
Kevin Reitz has suggested in a personal communication that although the argu-
ment of this paragraph is narrowly true, the plasticity ofjuveniles might excuse them
because it occurs at an earlier state of the developmental continuum, before they
have had a chance to outgrow the characteristics that produce culpability. This is an
attractive suggestion, but it concedes too much to matters of moral luck. There are
always causes for culpability at every stage in the life cycle, most of which are not at-
tributable to the agent's fault. Simply because one class of agents-juveniles-has a
high probability of "maturing out" does not entail that they were not culpable when
they acted. Nor, for that matter, does it entail that they should be differentiated from
some classes of adults who may also "mature out" or for whom the probability of posi-
tive change is high. Plasticity is far more relevant to a consequential theory of pun-
ishment as I suggest in the text immediately following.
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flow from treating adolescents as equally or less responsible
than adults who commit the same deeds. Some of the conse-
quential implications are considered in the next Part.
Let us begin by narrowing the question. At the very least,
no class of human beings, juveniles included, should be held
more morally responsible than the defining case of the ordinary
adult. Thus, ajuvenile faced with a hard choice to which a per-
son of reasonable firmness would yield should be excused, and a
juvenile incapable of reasonable rationality should likewise be
excused. Young children rarely commit crimes in response to
hard choices, and they lack many of the necessary attributes of
rationality, including a developed capacity for empathy. Moreo-
ver, young children infrequently commit serious crimes. Con-
sequently, the issue of full or substantial responsibility is not
seriously in contention for young children.
Mid-adolescents do commit serious crimes, 60 however, and
in many respects they may appear to meet the criteria for ra-
tionality. For example, few adolescents charged with delin-
quency are found non-responsible, although the insanity
defense and other excusing defenses are available in delin-
quency proceedings. The moral and legal responsibility of ado-
lescents is thus the critical moral and practical issue.
Many able scholars have reviewed the literature concerning
potential legally relevant differences between adolescents and
adults.6' I shall make the simplifying assumption that the near
consensus of their findings represents the most accurate current
assessment of those differences. In brief, the literature indicates
that the formal reasoning ability and the level of cognitive moral
development of mid-adolescents differs little from adults. Fur-
ther, on narrowly conceived cognitive tasks performed under
laboratory conditions that concern decisions about medical
60 See SICKMUND ETAL., supra note 3, at 34 (robbery, aggravated assault); HOWARD N.
SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcriMs: A NATIONAL REPORT
112-13 (1995) (violent crime).
6' BARRY FELD, BAD KIDs: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THEJUVENILE COURT 31-53 (1996);
Thomas Grisso, Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A Developmental Perspective,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 229 (1996); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., EvaluatingAdolescent Decision
Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 221 (1995); Lawrence Steinberg &
Elizabeth Cauffman, Matuity ofJudgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent
Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1996). See also Jennifer L. Woolard et al.,
Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Studying Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 219 (1996). The findings summarized in the text are derived from these
sources.
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treatment, there is little difference in outcome between mid-
adolescents and adults. As a class, however, adolescents: (1)
have a stronger preference for risk and novelty; (2) subjectively
assess the potentially negative consequences of risky conduct
less unfavorably; (3) tend to be impulsive and more concerned
with short-term than long-term consequences; (4) subjectively
experience and assess the passage of time and time periods as
longer; and (5) are more susceptible to peer pressure. All five
differences diminish with maturation throughout adolescence,
with most disappearing by mid- to late-adolescence, but they do
appear robust for adolescents as a class. It is crucial to remem-
ber, however, that a finding of a statistically significant differ-
ence between groups does not mean that there is no overlap
between them. In fact, the adolescent and adult distributions
on these variables overlap considerably; large numbers of ado-
lescents and adults are indistinguishable on measures of these
variables.
Mid-adolescent and adult formal reasoning, including in-
strumental reasoning, are indistinguishable, but these other dif-
ferences allegedly affect adolescent judgment and self-control.
Adolescents make serious mistakes as a result of developmental
immaturity that they would not make under similar circum-
stances after they mature. Consequently, many argue, adoles-
cents should be protected from the full consequences of their
immature mistakes, lest their lives be ruined by developmental
factors they would outgrow in the normal course of life.6 It is
important to remember, however, that all these characteristics
are matters of degree and by mid-adolescence most juveniles are
probably able to control them to a substantial degree, although
it may be harder for them than for adults.
Before continuing, we must consider the relevance of the
research concerning adolescence to juvenile criminal responsi-
bility. Most of the research summarized above investigated ado-
lescent decision-making and behavior in general and risk-taking
in particular; it does not examine adolescent criminal behav-
ior.63 Adolescent criminal conduct for the most part involves
62FRANKLIN ZIMEING, THE CHANGINGLEGAL WORLD OFADOLESCENCE 89-98 (1982).
0 See Grisso, supra note 61, at 238-42 (suggesting more empirical research is needed
before we can confidently conclude that differential legal treatment of mid-to late-
adolescents is warranted); Scott et al., supra note 61, at 238 (noting only a single study
comparing adult and adolescent decision making concerning criminal conduct).
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the intentional infliction of harm: the offender intentionally
killed, inflicted grievous bodily harm, raped, stole, destroyed, or
burned. That is, it is the adolescent's conscious objective to
cause in the immediate future precisely the harm the law pro-
hibits. Unless serious adolescent offenders are specially unlucky
or unskillful, they are practically certain to produce the harm
that is their conscious objective, and they know it. The inten-
tional harmdoer knows that the conduct invades the interests of
others; those interests may be given little value or otherwise ig-
nored or rationalized away, but they must be present to the ado-
lescent agent's mind. Adolescents can surely commit crimes of
risk creation, such as reckless homicide, but primarily serious
crimes of intention raise the issues that concern us. And for
crimes of serious risk creation, the risk is immediate and, once
again, the risked result will at least be present to the adoles-
cent's mind.
Risky conduct in general is different in important ways from
conduct intended to cause immediate harm: risky conduct often
is not criminal or seriously so; it often affects primarily the risk-
taker; often the probability of the harm risked may not be high;
and finally, often the risked result is a long-term, rather than an
immediate, consequence. For example, an adolescent may in-
tentionally drive too fast and engage in other forms of bravado,
but much conduct of this sort is not criminal. Much of the risk
is to themselves, and the probability of a serious harm, such as
death, is not high. Adolescents may also intentionally experi-
ment with drugs, but they face only the longer term and low
probability risks of endangering their ultimate social success
and health. Similarly, adolescents may intentionally engage in
unprotected sex, but such behavior is not criminal and creates
again the longer term, low probability risk of disease and preg-
nancy, and so on. The harms risked are serious, but the risky
conduct does not demonstrate substantial antisocial potential,
and in none of these cases is the result practically certain.
When an adolescent (or anyone else) decides whether to en-
gage in risky conduct, the potential harm does not weigh as
heavily as the adolescent's gratification. The latter is certain;
the former is not. Moreover, driven by a desire for gratification,
it is easier to fail to weigh sufficiently the interests of others that
one does not desire to harm and to underestimate the longer
term risk one's conduct produces.
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If risky conduct is statistically normal for adolescents, treat-
ing adolescents as criminals or proto-criminals may appear to be
criminalizing "normality," but this is not the case. Again the law
does not criminalize or seriously crimninalize much risk-creating
conduct. More important, no matter how much adolescents
may prefer risk, it can scarcely be claimed that serious crime is
the statistically normal mode that adolescents use to express
their preference for risk. To treat an adolescent murderer, rap-
ist, arsonist, and the like as simply a kid in search of risk and to
suggest that we should consider decriminalizing such conduct
among kids is neither justified by the data nor morally war-
ranted.
In sum, the relevance of the research on adolescent imma-
turity and poor judgment to intentional criminal behavior is
unclear. The desire for immediate gratification is likely to exert
more influence when the potential harm is uncertain (and not
criminal) than when it is intended (and criminal). What is
more, the moral reason not to engage in conduct is in general
vastly stronger and more immediate when the harm is intended
rather than risked,64 which explains why we consider intentional
harmdoing more culpable than risky harmdoing. Although
poor judgment may be characteristic of adolescent risk-taking,
there is no evidence that such judgment also infects intentional
criminal behavior. Adolescents have stronger reason to avoid
poor judgment when intentional criminal behavior is contem-
plated. If the primary variable adolescent offenders underesti-
mate is the risk of getting caught for their wrongdoing, this is
hardly reason to think that they are less responsible. Moreover,
recent research suggests that adolescents respond to the incen-
tive structure of the juvenile and criminal law much like adults.6
On empirical and normative grounds, the poor judgment
that characterizes adolescent decision-making generally may not
apply as fully to serious criminal conduct as it does to the behav-
iors the research on difference studied. Indeed, because the
vast majority of adolescents do not commit the most serious
criminal offenses,6 even in criminogenic environments, it is dif-
"WALLACE, supra note 11, at 179-80.
' See Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
' The arrest rate for juveniles for violent crimes, from 1983-92, when juvenile
crime rates were high, was no higher than about 1%, even at the highest risk age of
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ficult to assert that poor adolescent judgment is strongly predis-
posing to such offenses. For the present, however, I wish to
make the assumption that, in comparison to the case of adults,
poor judgment more substantially affects the criminal conduct
of adolescents as a class.
The potential excusing or mitigating force of these factors
that I have lumped together as "poor judgment" does not de-
pend on determinism, lack of free will, lack of choice, lack of in-
tention, a defect in the will, irresistible impulse, or the formal
inability to control oneself. Nonetheless, they surely all increase
the probability that an agent will engage in risky or harmful be-
havior; they all decrease the probability that an agent will exer-
cise her full capacity for normative competence when she
probably should. When tempted by the rewards of risky or
harmful conduct, the actor will either ignore or underweigh the
reasons not to engage in this conduct, although he may have
general normative competence. Thus, these factors decrease
the probability that the agent will act wisely. But this is true of
many characteristics that do not diminish responsibility. The
question is whether these developmental characteristics of ado-
lescence are reducible to sufficient, non-culpable defects in the
capacity for rationality or whether they should excuse for other
reasons.
The rationality criterion for moral responsibility requires
that an agent is capable of understanding the morally relevant
facts and the applicable moral reasons governing the conduct
under the circumstances. Moreover, I have argued that the ca-
pacity for empathy and guilt are necessary to fully comprehend
the nature of moral obligations. Unless one is capable of un-
derstanding the morally relevant facts and the rules and is capa-
ble of feeling empathy and guilt, one cannot be guided by good
reason concerning moral obligations. Practical reasoning about
a potential breach necessarily involves the facts, rules, and the
relevant, motivating emotions. These are the components of
moral reasoning and moral judgment.
It appears, however, that the variables distinguishing ado-
lescents from adults are not components of moral rationality.
An impulsive agent or one especially subject to peer pressure,
17. See SNYDER& SICKMUND, supra note 60, at 112. Even if the arrest rates substantially
understated the actual rates of juvenile homicide crime, the statement in the text
would still be true.
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for example, may have the general capacity for normative com-
petence. In this respect, these variables may be like other char-
acteristics, such as hot-temper or greed, that are also not
components of the general capacity for normative competence,
but that may make it harder to exercise this capacity. If so,
these variables would excuse only if they disabled the agent's
capacity for rationality to a sufficient degree to warrant exculpa-
tion. Thus, we need to know the effect of these variables on the
capacity for rationality and we need some sense of how much
disability is sufficient to excuse.
At the extreme, the case for excuse based on such variables
seems plausible. A thoroughly impulsive person for whom the
desire becomes the deed, with no mediating thought whatso-
ever, who has tried without success to overcome this characteris-
tic, may in fact lack the general capacity for normative
competence. A totally other-directed, dependent person lack-
ing any sense of autonomous selfhood, may be similarly situa-
tionally disabled when peer pressure is strongly brought to bear.
These are extreme cases by definition, however, and no one se-
riously argues that mid- to late-adolescents as a class meet this
description. It is a matter of degree. The strength of these vari-
ables is inversely proportional to the degree of difficulty an
agent will experience in exercising the general capability for ra-
tionality.
It will be instructive to consider why these variables have no
formal excusing force whatsoever for adults, except in extreme
cases that are typically assimilated to mental disorder, such as
impulse control disorders or the like. A highly impulsive or
peer-oriented adult will be held fully culpable for wrongdoing
potentiated by impulsivity or peer pressure. Indeed, many peo-
ple will tend to condemn wrongdoers for these characteristics.
The answer, I believe, is that we think that, except at the ex-
tremes, agents with these characteristics are sufficiently able to
grasp and to be guided by good reason when they are consider-
ing wrongdoing. It may be harder for them to be guided by
good reason, but they are nonetheless capable. And, after all,
potential violation of moral expectations gives an agent su-
premely good reason to exercise the rational capacity the agent
possesses.
Our moral and legal response to such variables is a product
of our common sense understanding of human behavior, fil-
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tered through our moral theory of how much capacity for nor-
mative competence an agent must possess to be held responsi-
ble. Everyone has been in a situation that made it harder to be
guided by the general capacity for rationality. Stress, fatigue,
rage, and a host of other variables that can undermine rational-
ity are ever-present features of the human condition, as is the
frequent desire to do wrong when in such states. Few people
have been able to avoid wrestling with demons. Nonetheless, we
know that virtually everyone virtually always is able to exercise
the general capacity for rationality and does not do wrong. Our
moral conclusion is that when wrongdoing, the breach of a
moral expectation, is in issue, the wrongdoer may be held ac-
countable, unless an adult agent's capacity for rationality is ex-
tremely and non-culpably disabled.
A substantial minority of adults is similar to mid- to late-
adolescents on the variables that distinguish the age cohorts as
classes. As noted, although the means may significantly differ,
there is a great deal of overlap between the distributions. A re-
grettable number of adults are immature and have dreadful
judgment. Yet we do not excuse that minority of adults. Why,
therefore, should adolescents be treated differently? Adults ob-
viously have more experience with the consequences of their
behavior and life experience generally and some mature as a re-
sult, but many do not. Impulsive or peer-oriented adults proba-
bly have always "learned" less from experience than their more
mature counterparts. Moreover, it does not take much life ex-
perience to understand how killing, raping, burning, stealing,
and so on affects others. To understand the consequences of
these actions does not require the sophistication and moral sub-
tlety that only experience can provide.
A second reason for treating adolescents differently might
be that immaturity is an inevitable "normal" developmental
characteristic of the adolescent, but it is not a developmental
characteristic of adulthood. This, too, is true, but its moral rele-
vance is obscure. A characteristic that makes it harder to grasp
and be guided by good reason may be a normal developmental
characteristic or it may be a dismaying outcome of a failure to
progress beyond a developmental stage. Nonetheless, if the
characteristic exists, it will exert its influence similarly, no mat-
ter what its provenance might be. And one can hardly morally
fault an adult for having a characteristic that is itself a product
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of developmental failure. Do we really believe that when we ask
a chronically immature adult to "grow up," that he or she has
the potential to change her character very much? Or, do we
really believe that telling a dependent adult to become more
independent will somehow render the person less vulnerable to
peer pressure?
Perhaps our society has a special moral obligation to at least
mitigate the responsibility of the minority of unfortunate juve-
niles who may be inclined to commit serious crimes for reasons
that they will outgrow or that are treatable. 7 But by the same
token, why don't we have a similar obligation to those unfortu-
nate adults whose life experiences have prevented them from
outgrowing or receiving help for similar problems. Both have
"impaired moral dispositions" through no fault of their own.
We can ask an immature or dependent adult to change his or
her behavior, provide the proper incentives to maximize the
chance that this will happen, and expect that some behavior
might change when something important is at stake. But the
same is true of adolescents. Moreover, it may be harder for an
adult to change behavior by "fighting against the grain" because
the dispositions are longer standing and more ingrained.
I find it hard to understand why adolescents and similar
adults should not be treated morally alike. If we believe that all
adults who possess the usually distinguishing adolescent charac-
teristics can fairly be held accountable, and thus permit no indi-
vidualized mitigating or excusing claims, I see no good reason
why mid- to late-adolescents as a class should be held less ac-
countable on the basis of these characteristics. Conversely, if we
believe these variables do sufficiently undermine the capacity
for normative competence to warrant mitigation or excuse for
mid- to late-adolescents as a class, then adult wrongdoers should
be permitted to make individualized excusing claims based on
these variables.
My analysis of the distinguishing variables implies that they
do not undermine the general moral responsibility of an agent
because they are not inconsistent with possessing the general
capacity for normative competence concerning the gross, obvi-
67 Kevin Reitz has made this morally appealing suggestion in a personal communi-
cation. As I argue in the text, however, I find it hard to differentiate juveniles from
adults in this respect. One could perhaps differentiate on consequential grounds,
but the case for a differential desert is difficult to discern.
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ously wrong conduct constituting serious criminal offenses. At
most, they make it harder for the agent to exercise the general
capacity for normative competence. For example, consider
again adolescent vulnerability to peer pressure. Adolescents are
more likely to commit violent crime in groups, such as in juve-
nile gangs.68 There can be no doubt that youths defining their
fluid adolescent identities in terms of their peers will find it
harder to consider the interests of those their peers wish to
harm. Indeed, there will be often be reasons and rituals to help
the potential adolescent wrongdoer devalue and demonize vic-
tims or otherwise rationalize her conduct. But most such ado-
lescents surely retain the general normative competence to
understand and be guided by the reasons that killing, raping,
burning, stealing, and so on are wrong, even when the pressure
of peers motivates them to ignore or to underweight these rea-
sons.
Although I conclude that the distinguishing characteristics
canvassed so far are not themselves part of normative compe-
tence and that they probably do not undermine the general ca-
pacity for normative competence, the research has not
addressed a potentially critical distinguishing variable-the ca-
pacity for empathy, which I claim is a component of normative
competence. Although adolescents have adequate formal rea-
soning powers and understanding of the content of the moral
rules, and sufficient life experience to understand the facts, in-
cluding the consequences of the serious crimes that concern us,
they may fully lack the general capacity for empathy that is a
component of full moral agency. Put another way, although
adolescents may be highly subject to peer pressure, they are also
developmentally self-centered, a quality that will usually dimin-
ish with normal maturation.69 The research literature is not al-
together clear on this question, but it seems to be a plausible
assumption. If this is correct, then adolescents as a class may be
less responsible moral agents in general and might deserve
mitigation, if not full exoneration.
' See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 60, at 56.69 See Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy, Social Cognition and MoralAction, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 275 (William M. Kurtines &Jacob L. Gewirtz eds.,
1991) (discussing the development of the capacity for empathy and its relation to moral
principles andjudgment).
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Once again, however, the comparison to adults will be in-
structive. The law does not excuse full-fledged psychopaths,7
who are apparently completely incapable of empathy and guilt
as a result of genetic or developmental variables. On my theory
of responsibility, such people should be excused and I wish to
proceed as if the law followed. After all, if it is really morally ac-
ceptable to hold genuine psychopaths fully accountable, the ar-
gument for holding adolescents less responsible on the basis
that they are not fully empathetic is anemic, at best. So, assum-
ing that insufficient empathy undermines moral agency gener-
ally, it appears that morality and the law should treat
adolescents and similarly situated adults alike. We cannot
blame the adolescent for the lack, because it is a normal devel-
opmental characteristic. But we can hardly blame the adult ei-
ther. The capacity for empathy is not the sort of characteristic
one can easily "work on" and alter, like one's handwriting or
manners. It is not even the type of characteristic, like impa-
tience or hot-temper, that one can learn techniques to control,
if not remove. Finally, we must ask how much lack of capacity
for empathy is required to justify mitigation or excuse? Do ado-
lescents lack it this much? Shouldn't adults who do so also be
entitled to make a mitigating claim similar to the adolescents'?
I have reached no conclusion about whether mid- to late-
adolescents as a class should be treated as less responsible than
adults. My analysis does lead me to conclude, however, that we
must very carefully identify why adolescents might be treated
differently, and if fairness requires differential treatment for the
class, it also requires that adults with the same responsibility di-
minishing characteristics should be treated equally.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This brief Part considers some of the conceptual, adjudica-
tive and dispositional consequences that follow from concluding
that mid- to late-adolescent serious offenders as a class should
not be distinguished from their adult counterparts. I propose
70 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (1962) (denying psychopaths a responsibility
defense).
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to explore these issues selectively and suggestively, rather than
comprehensively.
71
If we conclude that mid- to late-adolescent offenders as a
class are as morally responsible as adults, desert alone would
furnish no basis for differential response, although other puni-
tive and penological goals might. For example, dangerousness
and amenability to treatment may distinguish adolescents and a
system that considered consequential concerns in addition to
desert might well conclude that these factors should be em-
ployed in determining the appropriate disposition.
The more difficult question is how the law should respond if
dynamic developmental factors produce diminished general ca-
pacity for normative competence in large numbers of mid- to
late-adolescent serious offenders. Let us assume that adoles-
cents as a class are less responsible because they exhibit respon-
sibility-diminishing attributes, such as a lack of fully developed
capacity for empathy, that are a normal feature of their devel-
opmental stage. When determining culpability and disposition,
how should the law consider the diminished responsibility of
adolescents?
First, consider the adjudication of culpability. One re-
sponse is entirely to individualize the desert determination for
adolescent offenders to determine which offenders are not fully
responsible. After all, not all adolescents are alike, even if they
are distinguishable from adults as a class. The conclusion that
adolescents are distinguishable from adults must depend on the
ability to measure reliably and validly the distinguishing vari-
ables in the study samples. If there are no reliable and valid
measures of these variables, we cannot conclude that the classes
are distinct. If such measures are available, as they must be to
warrant the underlying conclusion of difference, then any indi-
vidual can be measured. A profile of potentially responsibility-
diminishing attributes could thus be obtained for any adoles-
cent offender and the score could be compared to the distribu-
71 In particular, I will not discuss whether the juvenile court should be retained as
an independent institution. For the argument that the juvenile court should be abol-
ished, see Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility,
and Sentencing Policy, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997). For the argument to
the contrary, see Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137
(1997).
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tions for adolescents and adults. Such individualization might
be difficult, involving subtle judgments about an offender's
cognitive and emotional status, but perhaps justice demands the
attempt.
Suppose that an adolescent offender scored substantially be-
low the adult mean for all the responsibility-diminishing vari-
ables? That is, suppose the adolescent exhibits far weaker
diminishing variables than the average adult. Unless there is
some other excuse theory suggesting that adolescents are less
responsible just because they are adolescents, such a finding
would suggest that in this case there is reason not to mitigate or
excuse. The reverse would also be true for adolescents who ex-
hibited far stronger diminishing variables than the average
adult. No test score can dictate culpability, of course, but it
would provide evidence that could be used to argue for greater
or lesser guilt. Such evidence would be more objective, how-
ever, than the usual sources, such as the clinical evaluations of
mental health professionals and others.
A second response would be for the law to adopt a rebutta-
ble presumption of partial responsibility for adolescent offend-
ers. Fairness and efficiency should require the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular adolescent
defendant was fully responsible. Although another level of bur-
den of persuasion could be used, liberty and stigma are essen-
tially at stake in determining if an adolescent is fully responsible
or not. These are precisely the interests that Winshi 2 identified
as requiring the reasonable doubt standard. It is plausible to as-
sume that in cases of obvious immaturity or where the evidence
of immaturity is strong, the prosecution would either accept
that mitigation was warranted or would be unable to bear its
burden of persuasion. Where the evidence of maturity is strong,
it suggests that this adolescent defendant has passed the stage of
development that warrants mitigation. In this case, full respon-
sibility would be both warranted and provable. Marginal cases
are probably the largest category, because the overlap between
mid- to late-adolescents and adults is so large. In these cases,
the prosecution will most often be unable to bear the burden of
persuasion and the presumption of partial responsibility will
prevail. This is the way it ought to be in a system that prefers in-
'In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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correct attributions of innocence (or lesser culpability) to incor-
rect attributions of guilt (or greater culpability). Assuming that
we can reasonably assess the attributes that distinguish adoles-
cents, such a system would allow us to individualize, with a
strong presumption in favor of partial responsibility.
The individualization described is analogous to the current
juvenile court waiver or transfer authority. It differs, however,
because it would be premised entirely on culpability, rather
than on public safety or, alas, concerns for vengeance. If
blameworthiness is a necessary precondition of punishment,
then less responsible adolescent defendants should not be fully
punished, no matter how dangerous they are or how dreadful
their deeds. And under the regnant mixed theory of punish-
ment, which holds that desert is necessary but not sufficient to
justify punishment, a fully responsible adolescent offender need
not be fully punished unless there is good consequential reason
for doing so.
Finally, I concluded at the close of Part III that if most or all
adolescents are only partially morally responsible, then similarly
situated adults should be treated similarly. I recognize that the
law may adopt a bright line test based on age to avoid the ex-
pense of individualization. Thus, if subjection to peer pressure
does somehow excuse and juveniles are more subject to it as a
class, there might be reason not to try to identify the small
group of juveniles not especially subject to peer pressure. The
search for efficiency in adjudicating juveniles then errs on the
side of leniency.
But this argument need not be symmetrical. Should adult
adjudication err on the side of severity and unfairness in the
search for efficiency? We generally hold that it is better to ac-
quit the guilty than to convict the innocent. Should not effi-
ciency yield to the need to individualize for the small class of
adults with the same characteristics as juveniles who therefore
might not be responsible? This argument for asymmetry is
analogous to the argument that the definition of defenses may
fairly be left more vague than the definition of offenses.73 If new
variables do not reduce to standard excusing conditions, ques-
tions like these must be addressed fully.
7' See KADISH & SCHtULHOFR, supra note 20, at 870-71 (presenting opposing
viewpoints).
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Now, let us consider the dispositional consequences. As-
sume first that some form of individualization was performed
and a minority of adolescent offenders was found fully respon-
sible. They should be treated according to whatever theory of
punishment was dominant. What seems clear in these cases,
however, is that the considerations that presumptively apply to
adolescents do not apply to them. Further developmental
maturation is not required to achieve the full capability for re-
sponsibility. Thus, the system should apply the same disposi-
tional considerations that it applies to adult offenders.
Assume, now, that individualization results in mitigation or
that all adolescents are conclusively presumed to warrant miti-
gation. In this case, developmental variables have resulted in
partial responsibility and a sensible dispositional response would
take account of those variables. In other words, wrongdoing in
these cases is in substantial measure a product ofjuvenile imma-
turity that will be outgrown under proper conditions. Once
outgrown, the wrongdoer is far less likely to make such "mis-
takes" in the future. The question, of course, is what possible
dispositions will facilitate maturation and protect the public
from dangerous juveniles. Reformatories and prisons, especially
if they are brutal, are hardly the types of environments that pro-
vide firm but caring discipline or the graded freedom and re-
sponsibilities that give adolescents the best chance to develop
mature, good reason. On the other hand, less secure institu-
tions may be insufficient for protection and the adolescent of-
fender's usual environment might be more criminogenic than
prophylactic. Although there are quite solid empirical findings
about the general characteristics of treatment programs that
"work,"7 4 valid classification of offenders is difficult,' 5 and we are
seldom sure about what works specifically for whom among the
various therapeutic interventions that might be tried. The dis-
position of partially responsible adolescents thus presents a gar-
gantuan dilemma.
What should we do about partially responsible adolescents
until the doctor comes with a dispositional cure? Attempts to
7' Mark Lipsey, Effective Intervention for Serious Juvenile Offenders: A Synthesis of
Research (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
' For example, if lack of the capacity for empathy diminishes responsibility,
incarceration term and treatment decisions would have to distinguish between normal
developmental conditions and genuine psychopathy, which can be very difficult.
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individualize terms of incarceration based on differential desert
are likely to be well-meaning but misguided shams. Perhaps the
best we can do is some legislatively-mandated reduction in pun-
ishment for all partially responsible adolescents.76 The balance
of just deserts and public safety could be obtained by an inverse
relation between the seriousness of the offense and the reduc-
tion mandated: more serious crimes would receive less reduc-
tion and vice versa. In addition to maximizing public
protection within a scheme of punishment reduction for partial
responsibility, this proposal seems presumptively fair because
serious crimes present the potential wrongdoer with the strong-
est possible reason to bring whatever rational capability could
be brought to bear on the intention to harm another.
I want to conclude this section by emphasizing again that
my primary focus on the implications of adolescent responsibil-
ity do not exhaust the range of considerations a sensible justice
system might consider when adjudicating and mandating dispo-
sitions for serious adolescent offenders. But to the extent that
desert is a necessary precondition for and a limit on punish-
ment, it cannot be ignored.
V. CONCLUSION
Consideration of the moral and legal responsibility of mid-
to late-adolescents depends on a prior, robust theory of respon-
sibility. I have tried to offer an interpretation of our responsibil-
ity and blaming practices that meets this test. Whether, on this
interpretation, adolescents should be treated differently from
adults is an open question, however. Even on the assumption
that behavioral research does demonstrate that there are sig-
nificant differences between adults and adolescents on variables
that bear on this theory of responsibility, whether the difference
is substantial enough to warrant differential moral and legal
treatment is a normative judgment that only society can make.
Society should do so in the terms of the theory of responsibility
applied, however, and should avoid begging questions because
ideology or sentiment hold sway. I have also concluded that if
adolescents are relevantly and sufficiently different, adults who
" I suggested (and rejected) such an approach for mentally abnormal but legally sane
adults long ago. See StephenJ. Morse, Diminished Capacity: A Moral and Legal Conundrum,
2 INT'LJ.L. & PSyCI-ATRY 271 (1979). I have recently revived the idea, however. See
Morse, supra note 26. The suggestion in the text follows the revival.
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are like adolescents in the relevant ways should be treated
equally. They should also be found partially responsible and
treated accordingly. Finally, if normal developmental features
render adolescents, or at least some of them, less responsible,
the disposition of adolescent offenders should facilitate matura-
tion to the fullest extent possible. This will not be a simple task.
